558 return often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Moreover, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills and commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar did not pass the examination or, having passed it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

517 The scholars, therefore, are not to be regarded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their livelihood on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisurely" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial classes. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current

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517 import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often bypassed in time of chaos; military skills enabled individuals to obtain high positions in the bureaucracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had acquired cultivation, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity by reason of their parents' wealth to acquire learning under the tutelage of well-known scholars.

C. Social Organizations

571 182 Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominence. However, they helped to supplement relationships otherwise neglected by the social order. Most of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. The success of such organizations, however, served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system.

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871 178 citizenship.[11] Their curricula opened a new and different world, far more interesting and intelligible to the younger generation than the Classics of old. If modern education had not always succeeded in giving new skills to the student, at least it had taught him not to be satisfied with his lot, to look to the future rather than to the past for betterment. 565 178 517 With the increase of schools, there emerged in the cities a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years from their original environment. Students and intellectuals, seeking some common meeting ground, banded together; with their newly-found organizations, came a semblance of a distinct class consciousness. Although many students depended for their subsistence on their families, they had nothing to do with the cultivation or management of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers

11. Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934; Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey 1839-1923, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

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515 178 517 for positions in the ruling elite, political power and economic power in modern China continued to be in the hands of a single group. When social mobility was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social roles were less clearly defined; the sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority of them came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families and were graduates of modern schools.[12] The labor

12. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-21.

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unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

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During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

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III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

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The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

668 Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take up more of his leisure. The slack winter season may now find him in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

668 Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[21] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional activities, modified by some new features to help promote government aims. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[22] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes but the mottoes will no longer carry the old

21. SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.
22. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23. 1955, p. 2.

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III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

517 184 565 Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Though the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them, at least, the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity and power. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of importance. But on the negative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists.

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517 Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually
184 substituting the freshly trained and well-in-
565 doctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government, where they could attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have been unable to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is a welcome move.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had the enthusiastic support of students. Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. However, while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to suppress entirely a simultaneous impulse toward individualism.

578 discontent and tension have not been eradicated.
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656 A. Public Discontent

1. Regimentation and Restriction.

517 The Communist attempt to organize the people
656 and regiment their activities meets the
668 greatest resistance. The forced establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all urban workers into unions are Communist efforts of note.

The imposition upon the peasants of spare-time activities and duties is perhaps the most objectionable feature. The peasant is required to attend meetings, to attend winter schools, to be advised on all farm activities, and to perform various duties according to his age and sex. Even how he is to spend his money is decided by Party counseling. Such advice is, in fact, a series of propaganda bombardments, which may include interviews, meetings, and classes. This process is both time-consuming and vastly irritating.

Similar restrictions are imposed upon the workers in the city. During working hours, workers are required to observe labor discipline. They are severly punished if they are late to work or leave early. Loafing and belligerence are crimes subject to punishment. During their "leisure time,"

517 656 668 workers are required to participate in organizational and cultural activities and to attend technical and cultural classes. Since most workers hold membership in a number of Communist organizations, no time is left for private affairs.

668 656 [651] 2. High Taxation and Public Obligation. High taxation and business restrictions are other unpopular Communist policies. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, formulated at the end of 1953, fixes a quota for farm production and for purchasing and marketing. Other measures which regulate the sale of farm surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- only to the centralized market, meet resistance. Businessmen are required to pay high taxes, pubchase bonds, and make "voluntary contributions." Other measures taken by the Communists to eliminate private business doubtlessly create great dissatisfaction among the people.

Public obligations imposed upon the people are also a cause for discontent. The peasant, for example, is called upon whenever his services are needed. For major irrigation projects, peasants are enlisted for work in distant areas. The service of the militia is necessary on many occasions, and so the young peasant is required to accept military training in his spare time. When he becomes a member of the militia, he must patrol the